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    CHINA’S HISTORIC RIGHTS IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA:  
       A TIME FOR RECONSIDERATION AND PACIFIC SETTLEMENT 
 
 In recent years, the South China Sea has featured prominently in news headlines 
concerning territorial disputes and claims to maritime resources involving China, the 
Philippines and Vietnam.  One of the most contentious disputes in the region is China’s 
so-called nine-dash line claiming historic rights deep into the South China Sea.  This 
thesis argues that China’s historic rights claims in the South China Sea are not supported 
by public international law and accordingly China should seek a settlement with the 
Philippines and Vietnam.   China should pursue a settlement because the Philippines and 
Vietnam can present persuasive legal arguments as to why China is not entitled to historic 
rights in the South China Sea.  Also, the ongoing dispute over rights impedes the ability 
of China and other claimant states to effectively exploit the rich resources of the South 
China Sea while significantly raising inter-state tensions and threatening regional 
economies.  Further, China’s insistence on maritime claims not in accordance with the 
provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea encourages other 
states to assert similar historic rights claims, which could ultimately threaten China’s 
national security.  Finally, China’s alleged interference with other states’ maritime rights 
in the South China Sea represents an unnecessary litigation risk of having multiple cases 
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 The South China Sea has historically been a crossroads of travel, trade and 
tensions between the bordering states.  In recent years, news headlines have been 
especially dominated by sovereignty disputes between China and neighboring states over 
islands in the South China Sea and sovereign rights to the resources of the South China 
Sea.
1
  One of the most contentious claims is China’s so-called “nine-dash line” claiming 
historic rights deep into the South China Sea.
2
  The Philippines and Vietnam have been 
strenuous in objecting to China’s historic rights claims in the South China Sea.  
Vietnam’s foreign ministry recently stated that Vietnam would apply "all necessary and 




 The Philippines has pursued an even stronger policy opposing China’s claims and 
on January 22, 2013, instituted compulsory arbitration proceedings against China before 
the Permanent Court of Arbitration.
4
  The Philippines pursued the arbitration proceedings 
under Annex VII of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
5
  
                                                        
1 Jeff Himmelman, A Game of Shark and Minnow, N.Y. TIMES, (Oct. 27, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/newsgraphics/2013/10/27/south-china-sea/. 
2
  U.N. Doc. CML/17/2009 from the Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of 
China to the UN Secretary-General, 
http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/chn_2009re_mys
_vnm_e.pdf (last updated May 3, 2011) (hereinafter Note Verbale CML/17/2009]. 
3
 Greg Torode, For South China Sea Claimants, A Legal Venue to Battle China, 
REUTERS, (Feb. 12, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/13/us-china-vietnam-
idUSBREA1C04R20140213. 
4
 Note Verbale No. 13-0211 from The Department of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of 
the Philippines to the Embassy of the People’s Republic of China (Jan. 22, 2013), 
https://www.dfa.gov.ph/index.php/2013-06-27-21-50-36/unclos [hereinafter Note 
Verbale No. 13-0211].  
5
 Id. at 1. UNCLOS is a comprehensive legal framework regulating uses of the oceans 
and the sovereignty rights of states.  U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for 
 2 
The Philippine arbitration claims are that (1) China’s rights in regard to maritime areas in 
the South China Sea, like the rights of the Philippines, are those that are established by 
UNCLOS; (2) China’s so-called nine-dashed line is contrary to UNCLOS and unlawful; 
(3) China be required to bring its domestic legislation into conformity with its obligations 
under UNCLOS; and (4) China desist from activities that violate the rights of the 
Philippines in its maritime domain.
6
  
 After the Philippines filed the claims, China refused to participate in the 
proceedings and rejected the arbitration panel’s jurisdiction.7  Despite China’s refusal to 
participate in the process, the arbitration case proceeds and the Philippines filed its initial 




 This thesis argues that China’s historic rights claims in the South China Sea are 
not supported by public international law and accordingly China should seek a settlement 
with the Philippines and Vietnam.  Several reasons exist for why China should pursue a 
comprehensive settlement.  First, the Philippines and Vietnam can assert persuasive legal 
arguments as to why China is not entitled to historic rights in the South China Sea. 
Second, the ongoing dispute over rights impedes the ability of China and other claimant 
states to effectively exploit the rich resources of the South China Sea while raising inter-
                                                                                                                                                                     
signature Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T. S. 397 (entered into force Nov. 16, 1994) 
[hereinafter UNCLOS].  
6
 Note Verbale No. 13-0211, supra note 4, at 17-19. 
7
 Department of Foreign Affairs Statement on China’s Response to the Philippines 
Arbitration Case Before UNCLOS, REPUBLIC OF PHILIPPINES DEP’T OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
(Feb. 19, 2013), http://www.gov.ph/2013/02/19/dfa-statement-on-chinas-response-to-the-
ph-arbitration-case-before-unclos/.  
8
 Peter Ford, Philippines Stares Down China in South China Sea Dispute, THE CHRISTIAN 
SCIENCE MONITOR, (Mar. 31, 2014), http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-
Pacific/2014/0331/Philippines-stares-down-China-in-South-China-Sea-dispute-video. 
 3 
state tensions.  Third, China’s insistence on maritime claims not in accordance with the 
provisions of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) encourages other 
states to assert similar historic rights claims, which in turn threatens to foreclose China’s 
access to maritime regions beyond the first island chain.  Finally, China’s alleged 
interference with other claimant states’ maritime rights in the South China Sea (in 
particular freedom of navigation) represents an unnecessary litigation risk.  
 Part II of this thesis will examine the geography of the South China Sea and the 
economic resources in the region.  Part III will then turn to the basic principles of law at 
play in the South China Sea dispute.  Part IV sets forth China’s historical claims as well 
as the Philippines and Vietnam’s claims.  In Part V the legal basis for China’s historic 
rights claims will be examined.  In Part VI the role of the Association of South East 
Asian States (ASEAN) in dispute settlement will be evaluated.  In Part VII, the 
economic, national security and litigation considerations favoring a comprehensive 
settlement will be explored.  Finally in Part VIII, this thesis will examine the 
recommended provisions of a settlement including creation of joint development zones 
and a binding Code of Conduct governing relations between claimant states in the South 
China Sea.  
 An arbitral ruling in favor of the Philippines has the potential to damage China’s 
international credibility and prestige.
9
  In the face of economic damage, national security 
constraints and liability risk, China should adopt a pragmatic approach to resolution of 
competing claims in the South China Sea.  A pragmatic solution most likely would 
                                                        
9
 Andrew Browne, Q & A: Taking China to Court Over the South China Sea, WALL ST. J. 
BLOG, (Oct. 15, 2013, 12:56 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2013/10/15/qa-the-philippines-
vs-china-in-south-china-sea-claims/. 
 4 
require China to abandon historic rights claims, negotiate joint development zones in 
areas where it currently asserts full sovereign rights and concede sovereignty over islands 
in the South China Sea.  But the benefit for China in making sovereign rights concessions 
would be regional stability, expanded economic development and greater regional 
cooperation.  China would find itself in an enhanced position with a far stronger ability to 
influence neighboring states.  
II. GEOGRAPHY OF THE SOUTH CHINA SEA 
 In order to understand the competing sovereignty claims of China, Philippines and 
Vietnam, it is vital to understand the geography of the region.  The South China Sea 
covers a vast swath of water totaling 648,000 square miles from the Luzon Strait in the 
north to the Malacca Strait in the south.
10
  Inside this vast expanse of water are hundreds 
of islands, including rocks, and reefs, as well as low-tide elevations, which are fully 
submerged at high tide.
11
  These features are distributed across the breadth of the South 
China Sea and can be grouped into several larger formations.  The most prominent 
disputed formations are the Paracel Islands in the north, which are disputed between 
China and Vietnam, the Spratly Islands in the south, which are primarily disputed 
between China, Philippines and Vietnam and Scarborough Shoal in the West disputed 
between China and Philippines.
12
   
 The Paracel Islands group of about 130 small coral islands and reefs lie about 250 
 miles east of Vietnam and about 220 miles south of Hainan Island, China. Apart 
 from a few isolated, outlying islands, they are divided into the Amphitrite group  
                                                        
10
 VICTOR PRESCOTT & CLIVE SCHOFIELD, THE MARITIME  POLITICAL BOUNDARIES OF 
THE WORLD 209 (1985). 
11
 U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., SOUTH CHINA SEA 1 (2013) [hereinafter EIA REPORT].  
12
 ZOU KEYUAN, LAW OF THE SEA IN EAST ASIA: ISSUES AND PROSPECTS 47 (2005).  
 5 
 in the northeast and the Crescent group in the west.  The low, barren islands, none  




 The Spratly Island group, which has been an area of particular competition, “consists of 
more than 140 islets, rocks, reefs, shoals and sandbanks spread over an area of more than 
410,000 square kilometers”.13  In the Spratly Island group, the Philippines claims 53 
features in the eastern portion of the group, which it refers to as the Kalayaan Islands.
14
  
China claims the entire Spratly Island group (Nansha Qundao to China) and Vietnam also 
claims the entire island group.
15
  The actual physical occupation of the Spratly Islands is 
a different matter as no one country occupies all of the features.  The Philippines has 
occupied 9 features, China has occupied 7 features and Vietnam is the most active with 
control over 27 features.
16
  
 Scarborough Shoal (referred to by China as Huangyan Island) is the remaining 
disputed feature between China and the Philippines.
17
  Scarborough Shoal is located 
approximately 124 nautical miles west of the Philippines’ Zambales province.18  
                                                        
13
 Grace Young & Gloria Lotha, Paracel Islands, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/442423/Paracel-Islands (last updated July 
22, 2013). 
13
 Robert Beckman, The South China Sea: The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and 
The Maritime Disputes in the South China Sea, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 142, 143, (2013). 
14
 SARAH RAINE & CHRISTIAN LEMIERE, REGIONAL DISORDER: THE SOUTH CHINA SEA 




 Id.  
17
 Nguyen Dang Thang & Nguyen Hong Thao, China’s Nine Dotted Lines in the South 
China Sea: The 2011 Exchange of Diplomatic Notes Between The Philippines and China, 
2012 OCEAN DEVELOPMENT & INT’L L. 35, 39.  
18
 Statement of Philippine Position on Bajo de Masinloc (Scarborough Shoal) and the 
Waters within its Vicinity, REPUBLIC OF PHILIPPINES DEP’T OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Apr. 
18, 2012), http://www.gov.ph/2012/04/18/philippine-position-on-bajo-de-masinloc-and-
 6 
Scarborough Shoal is a large atoll with an approximately 58 square miles lagoon 




 The South China Sea is home to some of the world’s most critical trade routes and 
is a center of the global economy with approximately $5 trillion in commerce flowing 
through the region on an annual basis.
20
  The waters are home to some of the world’s 
richest fishing grounds and there are an estimated 11 billion barrels of oil and 190 trillion 
cubic feet of natural gas in the region. 
21
  In the Spratly Islands region alone there is an 
estimated 2.5 billion barrels of oil and 25.5 trillion cubic feet of natural gas.
22
  Due to 
lingering questions over sovereignty in the region, there remain unexplored areas, which 
may contain even greater hydrocarbon resources.
23
   
 In light of these substantial unexploited economic resources in the region, it is no 
surprise that the States bordering the region have been drawn into greater diplomatic and 
physical conflict regarding sovereign rights over untapped resources.  
III. LAW OF THE SEA REGIME IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA 
 All of the claimant states in the South China Sea have ratified UNCLOS.
24
  Since 
all of the states involved in the dispute have assumed obligations under the UNCLOS 
                                                                                                                                                                     
the-waters-within-its-vicinity/  [hereinafter Statement of Philippines Position on Bajo de 
Masinloc].  
19
 Beckman, supra note14, at 145.  
20
  JAMES KRASKA & RAUL PEDROZO, INTERNATIONAL MARITIME SECURITY LAW 313 
(2013).  
21
 EIA REPORT, supra note 11, at 2.  
22
 Id. at 4. 
23
 Id.  
24
 The UNCLOS dates of ratification of the claimant states are: China, May 7, 1996; the 
Philippines, May 8, 1984; and Vietnam, July 25, 1994.  U. N. Treaty Collection, Status of 
Treaties, UNCLOS (Mar. 5, 2014, 8:03 AM),   
 7 
legal regime, in this section I will address briefly the history of UNCLOS and its legal 
regime.   
 The current maritime legal regime applicable in the South China Sea has its  
origins in the first United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea in 1958.  The 1958 
conference resulted in the following conventions: Convention on the Territorial Sea and 
Contiguous Zone, Convention on the Continental Shelf, Convention on the High Seas and 
a Convention on Fishing and Conservation of Living Resources of the High Seas.
25
  The 
four conventions did not address certain issues such as the breadth of the territorial sea or 
fishing rights, but they did serve as a foundation for subsequent state practice and 
ultimately for UNCLOS negotiations.
26
 
 UNCLOS established a comprehensive framework “for the allocation of 
jurisdiction, rights and duties among states that carefully balances the interests of states in 
controlling activities off their own coasts and the interests of all states in protecting the 
freedom to use the ocean spaces without undue interference.”27  UNCLOS was 
envisioned as a package deal in which individual states could not pick and choose 
                                                                                                                                                                     
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?&src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXI~6&c
hapter=21&Temp=mtdsg3&lang=en [hereinafter UNCLOS Status).  
25
 Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, opened for signature Apr. 29, 
1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, 516 U.N.T.S. 205 (entered into force Sept. 10, 1964); Convention 
on the Continental Shelf, opened for signature Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, 499 
U.N.T.S. 311 (entered into force June 10, 1964); Convention on the High Seas, opened 
for signature Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 450 U.N.T.S. 11 (entered into force Sept. 
30, 1962); Convention on Fishing and Conservation of Living Resources of the High 
Seas, opened for signature Apr. 29, 1958, 17 U.S.T. 138, 559 U.N.T.S. 285 (entered into 
force Mar. 20, 1966). 
26
 JAMES KRASKA, MARITIME POWER AND THE LAW OF THE SEA, 97-98 (2011).  
27
 KRASKA & PEDROZO, supra note 21, at 196-197. 
 8 
provisions they wished to adopt.
28
  In contrast to the 1958 Conventions, China, the 
Philippines and Vietnam ratified UNCLOS.
29
  
A.  Baselines and Internal Waters 
 The starting point in all analysis of maritime zones under UNCLOS is the 
baseline of the coastal state.  The baseline is defined as the line from which the seaward 
limits of a state’s territorial sea and other maritime zones of jurisdiction are measured.30  
The normal baseline for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea is the low-water line 
along the coast.
31
  Straight baselines may be drawn in instances of deeply indented 
coastlines or if there is a fringe of islands along the coast.
32
  Waters landward side of the 
baseline of the territorial sea form part of the internal waters of the state.
33
  The coastal 
state exercises with a few limited exceptions the same jurisdiction over internal waters as 
they do over land territory.
34
  In the case of an archipelagic state (a state constituted 
wholly by one or more archipelagos), the state “may draw straight archipelagic baseslines 
joining the outermost points of the outermost islands and drying reefs of the 
archipelago”.35  The territorial sea, contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone and 
continental shelf are measured from the archipelagic baseline.
36
   
 
 




 UNCLOS Status, supra note 25.  
30
 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE, THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL 
OPERATIONS 1-2 (2007).  
31
 UNCLOS, supra note 5, art. 5.  
32
 Id., art. 7. 
33
 Id., art 8. 
34
 KRASKA, supra note 27, at 114.  
35
 UNCLOS, supra note 5, arts. 46, 47. 
36
 Id., art. 48. 
 9 
B.  Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone  
 UNCLOS gave each state the right to establish a territorial sea up to 12 nautical 
miles in breadth.
37
  A nautical mile is 6076 feet in length (compared to 5280 feet length 
of statute mile).
38
  Subject to several important limitations, the coastal state may exercise 
sovereignty over the waters of the territorial sea, as well as the sea-bed below and 
airspace above.  The most important coastal state limitation is respect for the exercise of 
innocent passage by vessels when traversing the territorial sea.
39
  Passage is “innocent” 
if, “it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order, or security of the coastal state.”40 One 
maritime zone beyond the territorial sea is the contiguous zone, which extends up to a 
breadth of 24 nautical miles from the baseline.  In the contiguous zone, the coastal state 
may exercise jurisdiction regarding vessels that are circumventing its customs, fiscal, 
immigration, and sanitation matters.
41
   
C.  Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf and High Seas 
 Separate from the contiguous zone is the exclusive economic zone, which extends 
up to a breadth of 200 nautical miles from the baseline.  In the exclusive economic zone, 
the coastal state has the sovereign right to explore and exploit, conserve and manage the 
natural resources living and non-living of the waters and seabed.
42
   
 The continental shelf  “comprises the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas 
that extend beyond its territorial sea through the natural prolongation of land territory to 
                                                        
37
 Id., art. 3.  
38
 Shiveta Singh, Mile, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/382183/mile (last updated July 15, 2013).  
39
 UNCLOS, supra note 5, art. 17. 
40
 Id., art. 19. 
41
 Id., art 33. 
42
 Id., arts. 56, 57. 
 10 
the outer edge of the continental margin or a distance of 200 nautical miles from the 
baseline of the territorial sea.
43
  The coastal state has the exclusive right to explore and 
exploit the natural resources of the seabed and subsoil of its continental shelf.
44
 
 The areas of the sea not included in the exclusive economic zone, territorial sea, 
internal waters or archipelagic waters of a state form the high seas in which freedom of 




D.  Islands, Including Rocks, and Low-Tide Elevations 
 Islands are naturally formed areas of land surrounded by water and above water at 
high tide. They are entitled to the same maritime zones as other land territory.
46
  Rocks 
are islands, which cannot sustain human habitation and correspondingly are not entitled 
to an exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.
47
  A low-tide elevation is a “naturally 
formed area of land which is surrounded by and above water at low tide but submerged at 
high tide…it has no territorial sea of its own.”48  “Artificial islands, installations and 
structures are not islands and are not entitled to any maritime zones of their own.”49 
 In the South China Sea, there is no current consensus about the nature of the 
maritime features in the Paracel Islands, Spratly Islands and Scarborough Shoal or the 
corresponding zones, if any, they would be entitled to under UNCLOS.
50
    
                                                        
43
 Id., art. 76. 
44
 Id., art. 77. 
45
 Id., arts. 86, 87. 
46
 Id., art. 121. 
47
 Id., art. 121. 
48
 Id., art. 13. 
49
 Beckman, supra note 14, at 150. 
50
 NONG HONG, UNCLOS AND OCEAN DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: LAW AND POLITICS IN THE 
SOUTH CHINA SEA, 59 (2012). 
 11 
E.  Dispute Resolution 
 States are obliged to settle disputes peacefully in accordance with the provisions 
of Article 2 of the United Nations Charter.
51
  If a dispute cannot be settled then any state 
party to the dispute can request submission to a court or tribunal having jurisdiction.
52
  
Upon signature, ratification or accession to UNCLOS, a state is free to choose for dispute 
resolution the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ), an arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with Annex VII or a special 
arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with Annex VIII.
53
  “If parties to a dispute 
have not accepted the same procedure for the settlement of the dispute, it may be 
submitted only to arbitration in accordance with Annex VII”.54 When signing, ratifying, 
or acceding to UNCLOS, a state may declare it does not accept the binding dispute 
resolution procedures for disputes involving sea boundary delimitation, historic bays, 
titles and disputes concerning military activities.
55
 
IV. MARITIME CLAIMS IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA 
A.  China 
 The rich and complex history of the South China Sea provides the basis for 
China’s current maritime claims.  Chinese scholars have stated as a basis for asserting 
sovereignty that the waters of the South China Sea have been known time immemorial to 
                                                        
51
 UNCLOS, supra note 5, art. 279.  The U.N. Charter provides, “All members shall 
settle their international disputes by peaceful mean in such a manner that international 
peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.” U.N. Charter art 2, para. 3.  
52
 UNCLOS, supra note 5, art. 286. 
53




 Id., art. 298. 
 12 
Chinese fisherman and seafarers. 
56
  Since 2009 China has asserted historic rights claims 
based on a U-shaped or nine-dash line extending hundreds of miles from China’s 
mainland deep into the South China Sea.
57
  The origins of the contested nine-dash line 
can be traced to the beginning of the 20
th
 century. 
 The U-shaped line first appeared on a private map in December 1914.  The map, 
which was republished in the 1920s and early 1930s, contained a line only extending 
south to Pratas Reef and the Paracel islands.
58
  China’s position changed post-1933 in 
response to France (as the colonial protector of Vietnam) occupying nine of the Spratly 
Islands.  China protested this occupation and modified the U-Shaped line to extend 
further south inclusive of the entire Spratly Island group with the clear intention of 
asserting that the islands were part of China. 
59
   
 In 1935, China commissioned a geographical survey of the features of the South 
China Sea.  The government commission identified 132 names for islands and insular 
features in the South China Sea, which were published in an atlas that year.
60
  In 1946 
following the conclusion of World War II, China sought to exercise control over islands 
in the South China Sea that had been occupied previously by Japan.  China dispatched a 
naval contingent to Itu Aba Island in the Spratly Islands and erected a stone marker 
reflecting China’s sovereignty.61  In 1947, China’s Ministry of Interior drafted an official 
                                                        
56
 Zhiguo Gao & Bing Bing Jia, The Nine Dash Line in the South China Sea: History, 
Status, and Implications, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 98, 100 (2013). 
57
 Note Verbale CML/17/2009, supra note 2. 
58
 KEYUAN, supra note 12, at 48.  
59
 Id. at 49.  
60




map (utilized for internal purposes), which reflected the U-shaped line.
62
  The U-shaped 
line was noteworthy in that it replaced a continuous line with 11 separate segments.
63
  




 In 1951 China’s Foreign Minister, Zhou Enlai, stated that the Spratly Islands are 
inherently Chinese territory – this statement was reiterated in 1956 upon Philippine 
suggestions that some of the Spratly Islands should belong to them. 
65
 
 The first significant Chinese maritime law was adopted in 1958 with the 
Declaration on China’s Territorial Sea, which proclaimed that the Spratly Islands and 
Macclesfield Bank belonged to China.
66
  In advance of UNCLOS ratification, China 
promulgated on February 25, 1992 a Law on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone.
67
  
The 1992 law specifically provided that the land territory of China includes the mainland 
and its offshore islands including the Spratly Islands and Macclesfield Bank as well as all 
other islands that belong to China.
68
   China claimed Scarborough Shoal as part of the 
Macclesfield Bank.
69
  On May 15, 1996, China published partial base points for 
measuring its territorial sea and reserved the right to publish future base points for other 
areas including the Spratly Islands.
70
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 On June 7, 1996 China deposited at the United Nations the UNCLOS instrument 
of ratification.  China stated at that time it reaffirmed its sovereignty over all its islands 
and archipelagos listed in Article 2 of the 1992 Law on the Territorial Sea and 
Contiguous Zone.
71
  Following ratification, China promulgated a Law on the Exclusive 
Economic Zone and Continental Shelf on June 26, 1998.  The law did not provide 
coordinates for China’s exclusive economic zone, but did specifically state that the 
provisions of the law would not prejudice China’s historic rights.72   
 At the time China ratified UNCLOS, it made no declaration regarding acceptance 
of one of the dispute resolution forums available under the treaty. 
73
  On August 25, 2006 
China issued a declaration under UNCLOS Art. 298 concerning matters it would not 
accept as susceptible to international judicial or arbitral jurisdiction to include maritime 
boundary delimitation, territorial disputes and military activities.
74
 
 In response to a 2009 joint submission by Vietnam and Malaysia to the 
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, China stated in a note verbale of  
May 7, 2009, “ China has indisputable sovereignty over the islands in the South China 
Sea and the adjacent waters, and enjoys sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the relevant 
waters as well as the seabed and subsoil thereof”. 75   
 Accompanying the note verbale was the 1947 map of China reflecting a nine-dash 
line in the South China Sea.  The note verbale and accompanying map represented the 
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 Note Verbale CML/17/2009, supra note 2. 
 15 
first time China had presented a previously internal document as evidence of its historic 
rights claims over the South China Sea.
76
    
 In response to China’s note verbale, the Philippines challenged on three grounds 
the justifications China had relied upon in that document.  First, it stated the Spratly 
Islands constituted an integral part of the Philippines.  Second, under the Roman principle 
of dominum maris (land dominates the sea), the Philippines exercises sovereignty and 
jurisdiction over the waters adjacent to each relevant geographic feature in the Spratly 
Islands.  Third, the other relevant waters, seabed, and subsoil in the South China Sea that 
China claims is without basis in international law.
77
  On April 14, 2011, China responded 
to the Philippine note verbale stating,  “China has indisputable sovereignty over the 
islands in the South China Sea and the adjacent waters, and enjoys sovereign rights and 
jurisdiction over the relevant waters as well as the seabed and subsoil thereof....supported 
by abundant historical and legal evidence.”78   
 China further stated that, prior to the 1970s, the Philippines had never made any 
claims to the Spratly Islands.
79
  Unlike the 2009 note verbale, China did not attach the 
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B.  Vietnam 
Vietnam claims both the Spratly Islands and Paracel Islands (but not Scarborough Shoal) 
based on Vietnam’s naval activity in the 17th-19th centuries.81  Vietnam has stated,  
it has maintained effective occupation of the two archipelagoes Paracel and 
Spratly islands at least since the 17th century when they were not under the 
sovereignty of any country and the Vietnamese State has exercised effectively, 
continuously and peacefully its sovereignty over the two archipelagoes until the 
time when they were invaded by the Chinese armed forces.
82
   
Further, “Vietnam claims that France administered the islands as part of its protectorate, 
established under a 1884 treaty.”83  In December 1933, France incorporated the Spratly 
Islands into Vietnam’s Ba Ria province.84  In June 1956, the government of South 
Vietnam reaffirmed its sovereignty over the Spratly and Paracel islands.
85
  In January 
1974 China “seized control of the remaining Paracel Islands after an air and sea battle 
with South Vietnamese forces.”86  In 1989 Vietnam increased its occupation in the 
Spratly Islands to 21 islets and reefs.
87
  In 1994 Vietnam ratified UNCLOS but 
reaffirmed sovereignty over the Paracel Islands and Spratly Islands.
88
  Vietnam did not 
elect dispute resolution procedures under Art. 287 nor any exceptions under Art. 298.
89
 
 In 2009 Vietnam filed a joint claim with Malaysia to the UN Commission on the 
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Limits of the Continental Shelf claiming an area in the South China Sea beyond their 200 
nautical mile exclusive economic zone.
90
  In 2012 Vietnam promulgated a maritime law 
that delineated its maritime boundaries to include the Paracel Islands and Spratly Islands 
(but not Scarborough Shoal).
91
 
C.  Philippines 
 “The Philippines is one among a few mid-ocean archipelagos in the world.”92  
The Philippines comprise approximately 7,107 islands and other geographic features 
covering 120,000 square miles.
93
  The Philippines archipelagic state is bounded by the 
Luzon Strait in the north and the Surigao Strait south.
94
   In recent years, the Philippines 




 The historical origin of Philippine maritime claims can be traced to the 1898 
Treaty of Paris settling the Spanish-American War.  The Philippines claimed as 
archipelagic waters the limits of the seas described in the 1898 treaty.
96
  Scarborough  
Shoal and the Spratly Islands were not included in the limits of the 1898 treaty 
boundaries.
97
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 The Philippines first affirmatively asserted its claims to the Spratly Islands and 
Scarborough Shoal in 1956.  The Philippine government statement at the time reflected a 
view that these formations were terra nullius and therefore subject to claim by the 
Philippines.
98
  Chinese Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai vigorously protested Philippine 
claims at that time.
99
  In 1961 the Philippines enacted archipelagic baselines legislation 
enclosing the islands forming the archipelago, but did not include Scarborough Shoal or 
the Spratly Islands inside the baselines.
100
  The Philippines experienced significant 
difficulties in achieving international recognition of its archipelagic status and domestic 
political disagreements impeded passage of legislation in accordance with UNCLOS.
101
 
 The generally cautious approach towards the disputes previously taken by the 
Philippines changed in 1971.  Following a confrontation in the Spratly Islands between 
Philippine nationals and a Taiwanese patrol vessel, the Philippines issued a protest 
demanding that “Taiwan withdraw from Itu Aba Island (in the Spratly Islands) and 
declared ownership of 53 islands, cays, reefs, and shoals.”102  Subsequently in 1978, 
Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1596 annexing the 
western portion of the Spratly Islands to the Philippines (referred to as the Kalayaan 
Island Group) and incorporating them as a municipality in Palawan Province.
103
  The 
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Presidential decree was unique in that it not only asserted authority over the insular 




 The Philippines established an exclusive economic zone in June 1978 by 
Presidential Decree No. 1599.
105
  Scarborough Shoal’s location within the claimed 
Philippine exclusive economic zone has been utilized as a basis for the Philippines 
asserting sovereignty over the reef.
106
  The Philippines was one of the first countries to 
ratify UNCLOS in 1984.
107
  Archipelagic baseline legislation in conformance with 
UNCLOS was not enacted in the Philippines until March 10, 2009 when Republic Act 
9522 (Philippines Archipelagic Baselines Act) was passed.
108
  The Spratly Islands and 
Scarborough Shoal were not included within the Philippine archipelagic baselines and 
instead were placed under a separate maritime regime.
109
  A group of Philippine citizens 
challenged this legislation as a violation of the maritime boundary under the Treaty of 
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 In April 2012, following a confrontation between Chinese fishing vessels and a 
Philippine coast guard vessel at Scarborough Shoal, the Philippines issued a formal 
statement reiterating Scarborough Shoal is an integral part of Philippine territory, lies 
within the Philippines exclusive economic zone, is not an island but rather a group of 
rocks, is not part of the Spratly Islands and falls under the full sovereignty and 
jurisdiction of the Philippines. 
111
  
 As previously discussed, on January 22, 2013, the Philippines instituted 
compulsory arbitration proceedings against China pursuant to UNCLOS Article 287 and 
in accordance with Annex VII.
112
  The Philippine arbitration claims center on China’s 
rights in the South China Sea, China’s nine-dashed line under UNCLOS, China’s 




V.  CONSIDERATION OF HISTORIC RIGHTS 
 In order to understand the legal merits of China’s historic rights claims, an 
examination is first necessary of what exactly China is claiming in the South China Sea.  
Based on the numerous official statements and legislation, it appears China is making 
historic rights claims inclusive of both historic waters claims over the waters of the South 
China Sea and historic title claims over the islands, including rocks, and features of the 
South China Sea.
114
  “The concept of historic rights is broader than that of historic waters 
and includes the latter.  It can thus give China the flexibility of pushing forward its claim 
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from historic rights to historic waters, if necessary.”115  Therefore, an assessment of 
China’s broad historic rights claims will first focus on their legitimacy as historic waters 
claims and then will be followed by a consideration of the legitimacy of China’s historic 
title claims over the islands, rocks and other features of the South China Sea.  
A.  Historic Waters 
 The first mention of China’s historic waters claims in the South China Sea was a 
modest reference in the Declaration of Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf 
Act of 1998, in which China stated, “the provisions of this act shall not affect the 
historical rights of the People’s Republic of China”.116  While the Exclusive Economic 
Zone Declaration did not provide clarification as to the meaning of this sentence, it 
provided an indication that China thought it had special rights in the South China Sea.  
China did not make further official pronouncements about historic waters until over ten 
years later when in May 2009 it filed the note verbale in response to Malaysia and 
Vietnam’s joint continental shelf submission.  In the note verbale, China justified its 
sovereign rights to almost the entire South China Sea on the basis of the 1947 map.
117
 
 China followed up the historic claims with the 2011 note verbale (in response to 
the Philippines) in which it ambiguously stated, “China’s sovereignty and related rights 
and jurisdiction in the South China Sea are supported by abundant historical and legal 
evidence.”118  China’s position of historic waters has continued to be touted by 
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government officials and academics alike with China’s Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi 
stating in 2012 that there is “plenty of historical and jurisprudence evidence to show that 
China has sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea and the adjacent 
waters.”120 
 Historic waters are defined as, “waters over which the coastal State, contrary to 
the generally applicable rules of international law, clearly, effectively, continuously, and 
over a substantial period of time, exercises sovereign rights with the acquiescence of the 
community of states.”119  The definition of historic waters was further clarified by the 
International Court of Justice in the El Salvador v. Honduras case (over the Gulf of 
Fonseca) in which the court opined that historic waters are, “waters which are treated as 
internal waters but which would not have that character were it not for the existence of 
historic title.”120  In essence historic waters are extension of internal or territorial 
waters.
121
   
 The ambiguous nature of historic waters is highlighted by the fact that the concept 
is not fully codified in UNCLOS and is only mentioned in passing in a handful of articles 
without any specific definition.
122
  Therefore, authority for maritime entitlement based on 
historic waters must be found solely in customary international law.  The International  
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Law Commission in 1962 conducted a study of historic rights.
125
  The study “examined 
the elements of title to historic waters, the issues of burden of proof, the legal status of 
waters regarded as historic waters, and the settlement of disputes.”123  The study 
identified three factors necessary for a state to claim sovereignty over maritime areas that 
otherwise would be international waters; (1) authority must be exercised over the area by 
the state claiming it as historic waters; (2) such exercise of authority must be continuous; 
and (3) other states must acquiesce.
124
  Further, a state, which is making an exceptional 




 The wording of China’s 2009 and 2001 note verbales given plain meaning 
certainly appear to claim historic waters in the South China Sea.  “China has indisputable 
sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea and the adjacent waters, and enjoys 
sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the relevant waters as well as the seabed and 
subsoil thereof.”126  China’s statement represents a direct challenge to the UNCLOS legal 
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 If China were able to articulate a basis for consideration of its historic waters 
claims outside the UNCLOS framework then the legitimacy of China’s claims must be 
scrutinized under rules of customary international law.  An assessment of China’s claims 
under the International Law Commission’s three factors reflects that China fails to meet 
the basic requirements for satisfying any of the conditions necessary to establish a 
historic waters claim in the South China Sea.  In the following section consideration will 
be given to each factor to demonstrate how China fails to make a legitimate claim of 
historic waters.  
(1) Exercise of Authority 
The first factor for consideration is the authority exercised over the area by the state 
claiming it as historic waters.
128
  An initial survey of the geography of the South China 
Sea undercuts the notion that China exercises authority over the region.  In the north 
portion of the South China Sea, China is faced with competing claims by the Republic of 
China (Taiwan) in the waters around the Taiwan Strait, Pescadores and Pratas Reef.
129
  
China does not exercise uncontested authority and has been unable to enforce even basic 
restrictions on freedom of movement in the waters as evidenced by frequent military 
activities of the U.S. Seventh Fleet in these waters.
130
   
 Perhaps to build on its claims of authority in the northern portion of the South 
China Sea, China in 2013 declared an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) similar to 
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the one in the East China Sea that China has created in an area disputed with Japan.
131
 
The establishment of an ADIZ as a step towards consolidating China’s authority fit 
within what has been described as the “salami slicing” strategy.  The “salami slicing” 
strategy involves China establishing authority through small individual measures that 
alone are not a casus belli but collectively have the effect of creating evidence of China’s 
long term presence in the region.
132
   
 China’s recent history of confrontation in the western portion of the South China 
Sea is reflective of a strategy of military provocation in order to assert total dominance 
over the region, but does not reflect an uncontested exercise of Chinese authority in the 
region.  In the western region, China occupies the Paracel Islands, which it seized from 
South Vietnam in 1974 (while that state was in a weakened condition due to internal 
conflict).
133
  However, China does not exercise total authority over the waters and 
airspace of the western region.  Perhaps as part of a deliberate strategy, China has 
engaged recently in series of high profile confrontations with the United States and 
Vietnam challenging those states over what otherwise would be lawful activities within 
China’s claimed exclusive economic zone and the high seas.   
 The first of these incidents occurred on April 1, 2001 when a Chinese fighter 
collided with a United States Navy EP-3 surveillance aircraft flying in airspace over 
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China’s exclusive economic zone, approximately 65 miles southeast of Hainan Island.134  
The next significant incident was in March 2009 when several Chinese flagged vessels 
“challenged USNS Impeccable while she was conducting a military survey 100 nautical 
miles off the coast of China”.135  A more recent confrontation occurring between April 
and May 2011 involved a China Marine Surveillance agency vessel cutting cables to 
Vietnamese vessels engaged in oil exploration.  In response to Vietnamese protests, 
China asserted that the waters were not within Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone and 
reiterated “China has indisputable sovereignty over the South China Sea islands and 
adjacent waters.”136   
 In the southern portion of the South China Sea, China’s authority over the waters 
surrounding the Spratly Islands is also hotly disputed.  As previously discussed, China is 
not the most active claimant in the Spratly Islands and only occupies seven of the 
features.
137
  Vietnam exercises greater influence in the waters around the Spratly Islands 
through its occupation of twenty-seven features.
138
  The largest island in the Spratly 
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group, Itu Aba, is controlled by Taiwan.
139
  In spite of this relatively weak authority in 
the waters surrounding the Spratly Islands, China has taken steps to exercise greater 
authority over the region.  In particular, China has exercised authority at the expense of 




 China’s efforts to consolidate authority in the South China Sea were most recently 
observed in the eastern portion of the South China Sea with the standoff between China 
and the Philippines at Scarborough Shoal in April 2012.  China succeeded in preventing 
the Philippines from arresting Chinese fisherman and ultimately prevailed in forcing the 
Philippines to withdraw from the disputed formation.
141
   
 While all of these actions taken together appear to reflect a deliberate Chinese 
strategy of consolidating authority over the features and waters of the South China Sea, 
they also reflect a fundamental weakness in China’s historic waters claims.  China fails to 
demonstrate the exercise of full authority in the region and thus fails to satisfy the basic 
requirements of the first factor for analysis of historic waters claims.  
(2) Continuity of Authority 
  If China succeeded in demonstrating authority over the region, it would still 
experience significant difficulties in demonstrating the continuity of the exercise of such 
authority over areas claimed as historic waters.  The earliest claims of exercising 
authority in the South China Sea have often been referenced by Chinese academics and 
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officials as dating to 300 Common Era (C.E.) when Chinese explorers and merchants 
discovered the Spratly Islands and Paracel Islands.
142
  Even if such discovery occurred, 
there is ample evidence to demonstrate that China has not exercised continuous authority 
since 300 C.E.  There is no doubt that China had extensive diplomatic and trade contacts 
with South China Sea states from the 5
th
 century onward and the South China Sea was 
often referred to as the “Silk Road on the Sea”.143  However, these trade contacts did not 
reflect continuity of authority but merely economic ties, which waxed and waned with the 
prevailing regime in China.  In particular, the authority of China in the region 
experienced significant diminishment in the period after the 1840s as Western powers 
constrained China.
144
   
 The first indication of China’s claim to any portion of the South China Sea is 
reflected in the 1914 map.
145
  But as discussed previously, the 1914 map only reflected a 
Chinese claim in the northern portion of the South China Sea.
146
  If this map were to be 
accepted as historic evidence then it would be at least be more consistent with the 
commonly held belief that historic waters can only be an extension of internal water or 
territorial waters and not waters hundreds of nautical miles away from the coastal state.
147
  
 The ensuing decades have done little to bolster China’s claim to continuity of 
control.  In the 1930s France, as the colonial protector of Vietnam, occupied the Spratly 
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 Dupuy & Dupuy, supra note 77, at 139. 
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Islands despite diplomatic protest from China.
148
  Vietnam occupied and controlled the 
Paracel Islands until the early 1970s when China used force to eject them.
149
  From the 
1950s onward, the Philippines has occupied portions of the Spratly Islands and from the 
1970s forward exercised authority over Scarborough Shoal.
150
  Only in the last 15 years, 
beginning with the 1998 Declaration of Exclusive Economic Zone, has China begun 
vigorously asserting claims of continuity of control.   
 The watershed moment in China’s claim to the entire South China Sea is the 2009 
note verbale with the attached 1947 map reflecting the nine-dash line. In the absence of 
actual continuous physical authority over the waters of the region or a historical record 
that supports continuous authority over the region, China relied on an obscure Ministry of 
Interior map to demonstrate its long-standing control over the region.
151
  If the 
authenticity of the map is to be accepted then consideration must be given to the intrinsic 
value of the map in establishing continuity of China’s historic waters claims in the South 
China Sea.  
 As an initial matter, “the actual weight to be attributed to maps as evidence 
depends on a range of considerations.  Some of these relate to the technical reliability of 
the maps.” 152  If the 1947 map is to be treated as historic evidence before an international 
court of tribunal then it must meet, “The first condition required of maps that are to serve 
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as evidence on points of law is their geographical accuracy.”153  Another consideration, 
“which determines the weight of maps as evidence relate to the neutrality of their sources 
towards the dispute in question and the parties to that dispute.”154  Only if the map 
reflects the agreement between states potentially concerned can a map be seriously 
considered as evidence.
155
  A consideration of China’s 1947 finds it seriously lacking in 
both instances.  The most notable feature is that the map contains no geographic 
coordinates and defines maritime boundaries in a very imprecise manner.
156
  As such, the 
map is of little to no value in assessing China’s claimed maritime boundary.  The map’s 
apparent lack of neutrality is an equally undermining factor because it is the product of 
China’s Ministry of Interior and was treated mainly as an internal document for 
decades.
157
  The South China Sea claimant states have rejected the 1947 map and China’s 
historic claims asserted under it.
158
  In light of this rejection by other claimant states and 
absence of drafting by a neutral cartographer, the relative value of the map in proving 
China’s claim is negligible.  
 In sum, China fails to meet the “continuity of authority” requirement in the South 
China Sea necessary to demonstrate that the waters are of a historic character unique to 
China.  Rather the historical record reflects that China has regularly vied with colonial 
powers and other claimant states for control of the waters of the South China Sea.  
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 The third factor necessary to establish a historic waters claim is the attitude of 
foreign states (or acquiescence).
159
  Acquiescence, like the continuity factor, is closely 
interrelated with the concept of the passage of time.  Therefore, “the longer a claim has 
been in existence the less may be the required degree of acquiescence.  Conversely, the 
shortness of period of claim may be compensated for by the speed and extent of foreign 
state acceptance.”160  Additional considerations when assessing foreign acquiescence to 
historic waters claims include whether the state has provided explicit notification of the 
historic waters claim. “If a state shows no conclusive evidence of an historic claim being 
established in its internal laws at the relevant time, it is impossible to deduce the 
acquiescence of states in such a system whether from their action or inaction.”161  In 
addition, if the historic waters claim is geographically uncertain this affects other States 
awareness of the historic claim and so with it their ability to acquiesce.
162
 
 In the context of China’s historic waters claim in the South China Sea, the 
requirement of acquiescence presents a near impossibility to it being recognized under 
international law.  As an initial matter, the historic record as discussed in above sections 
reflects that other than an oblique reference to historic rights in the 1996 Exclusive 
Economic Zone proclamation, China’s assertion of a historic waters claim is relatively 
recent.
163
  The first explicit notification the world received of China’s asserted historic 
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waters claims was the 2009 note verbale.
164
  The vagueness of the 2009 note verbale in 
and of itself proved problematic due to China providing no further explanation beyond 
the attached nine-dash line map.
165
  China did nothing to clarify the uncertainty 
surrounding the note verbale and instead adopted a position of reiterating the basic claim 
with no further elaboration.
166
  
 The absence of clarity as to the exact nature and extent of Chinese historic claims 
created initial confusion in South China Sea claimant States but they eventually 
responded with forceful rejections of China’s claims.167  In addition to diplomatic 
protests, the regional States also demonstrated operational protest through actions such as 
the previously discussed Philippines coast guard patrol of Scarborough Shoal.
168
  The 
most significant non-acquiescence to China’s historic claims lies in the compulsory 
arbitration proceedings instituted by the Philippines against China under UNCLOS in 
which the Philippines seeks a finding that the nine-dashed line map is contrary to 
UNCLOS.
169
   
 Based on the above analysis, China fails to satisfy the third International Law 
Commission factor for historic waters due to the relatively recent nature of its historic 
waters claim, the lack of clarity as to its claims and the vocal non-acquiescence of other 
South China Sea claimant states.  China has consistently declined to articulate the basis 
for its historic waters claim and in failing to do so has failed to demonstrate how it is a 
special case meriting consideration outside of the UNCLOS framework.  
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B.  Historic Title 
 In addition to claiming historic waters in the South China Sea, the historic rights 
claimed by China in the 2009 note verbale extended to the islands of the region.  This 
sovereignty claim can be interpreted as being based on a form of historic title.
170
   As 
previously discussed, China has declined to further clarify the nature of the sovereignty 
claims contained in the 2009 note verbale, but since China based the claims on the 




 The general rule on acquisition of territory was stated in the Eritrea v. Yemen 
arbitral decision, where the panel stated,  “The modern international law of the 
acquisition (or attribution) of territory generally requires that there be: an intentional 
display of power and authority over the territory, by the exercise of jurisdiction and state 
functions, on a continuous and peaceful basis.” 172  Within the doctrine of acquisition of 
territory is the subsidiary doctrine of historic title.  It was defined in the Eritrea v. Yemen 
decision as, “a title that has been created or consolidated, by a process of prescription or 
acquiescence, or by possession so long as to become accepted by the title of law.”173  In 
essence, “it amounts to a recognized territorial title established over time in the absence 
of protest, the provenance of which is unclear”. 174  The control must be uncontested and 
non-controversial over a meaningful period of time.
175
  Relying upon the theory of 
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historic title, it would be possible for a state to engage in the acquisition of sovereignty 
over land territory through a process of consolidation of historic title.
176
  Under this 
theory, “a state’s sovereignty over a given territory could be established by focusing on 
factors such as the state’s long-standing vital interests and the general tolerance or 
recognition by other states of the claim to sovereignty, rather than on effective and 
continuing exercise of authority.”177  The acquisition of territory by consolidation of 
historic title is controversial and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in Cameroon v. 
Nigeria stated historic consolidation “cannot replace the established modes of acquisition 
of title under international law, which take into account many other important variables 
of act and law.”178  
  While it is not unusual for historical evidence to be utilized as a basis for a 
contemporary claim, the limited value of historic evidence in ultimately determining 
sovereignty was discussed by the tribunal in Eritrea v. Yemen, in which the tribunal 
stated that amongst competing parties where there has been, “much argument about 
claims to very ancient titles, it is the relatively recent history of use and possession that 
ultimately proved to be a main basis of the tribunal decisions.”179 
 The evidentiary value of the 1947 map in proving historic title must also be given 
consideration.  One of the first opinions addressing the relative value of maps was the 
1928 Island of Palmas case before the Permanent Court of Arbitration, which was 
considering a dispute between the Netherlands and the United States over an island 
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located between Indonesia and the Philippines.
180
  The arbitrator in that case stated, “only 
with the greatest caution can account be taken of maps in deciding a question of 
sovereignty.”181  The value of maps in sovereignty disputes was further considered by the 
ICJ in the 1986 Burkina Faso v. Mali case where the Court stated, “maps merely 
constitute information” and “of themselves and by virtue solely of their existence, they 
cannot constitute territorial title.”182  In view of this international legal precedent, the map 
rather than demonstrating China’s historic title does little to prove China’s sovereignty 
claims and at best reflects the internal historic perspective of the Chinese government.   
 Regardless of claims to historic title consolidated by long use of a territory, a state 
is still required to demonstrate authority over the territory as well as acquiescence by 
neighboring states.  It can also be considered a corollary requirement that the acquisitive 
state be peaceful in its exercising sovereignty.
183
  
 The use of force by China in occupying the Paracel Islands in 1974 presents a 
challenge in advancing the legitimacy of China’s historic title claim.  China is an original 
member of the United Nations.
184
  In joining the United Nations, China obliged itself to 
refrain from the use of force or the threat of the use of force and committed itself to 
resolving disputes peacefully.
185
  The use of force against Vietnam in occupying the 
Paracel Islands could be viewed as a breach of the peace, which violates the spirit and 
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letter of the United Nations Charter thus delegitimizing any legal bases China asserts to 
historic title.  In addition, China would be unable to satisfy one of the basic elements of 
proving a claim to historic title that the state was peaceful in exercising its authority.
186
  
A final consideration for China’s historic title claim in the Paracel Islands regards the 
principle of uti possidetis.
187
  The post-colonial history of Vietnam resulted in the country 
being divided and not achieving reunification until 1975.
188
  Therefore, if China were to 
claim that there was a single successor state to French Indochina, which fixed territorial 
boundaries in China’s favor, it would be nearly impossible to support this assertion based 
on the historical record of Vietnam being divided for twenty years post-independence.  
 Regarding claims of Chinese historical title in the Spratly Islands, the historical 
evidence is even weaker.  The Spratly Islands remained an essentially uninhabited island 
group until the early 1930s.
189
  The first significant territorial acquisition in the Spratly 
Islands was in 1933 when France treated the islands as terra nullius and occupied 
them.
190
 While China vigorously protested this action, the inability to prevent the 
occupation reflected the weak to non-existent Chinese presence in the island group at that 
time.
191
  In the intervening years, Vietnam and the Philippines took substantial action to 
occupy features in the Spratly Islands and have been vigorous in non-acquiescence to 
China’s claims of sovereignty.192  Finally, the principle of uti possidetis would run 
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counter to China’s claims in the Spratly Islands and in favor of Vietnam if substantive 
weight is given to the historical evidence of France having occupied and the Spratly 
Islands in 1933 as terra nullius.  
 A final consideration concerns the acquisition of a low-tide elevation as territory 
by historic title.  The ICJ in the Qatar v. Bahrain case considered this question and 
stated, “international treaty law is silent on the question whether low-tide elevations can 
be considered to be territory.”193  The ICJ went on to state, “The few existing rules do not 
justify a general assumption that low tide elevations are territory in the same sense as 
islands..…It is thus not established that in the absence of other rules and legal principles, 
low-tide elevations can, from the viewpoint of the acquisition of sovereignty, be fully 
assimilated with islands or other land territory.
194
  The question of acquisition of 
sovereignty over low-tide elevations was further addressed in the Nicaragua v. Colombia 
case in which the ICJ stated, “It is well established in international law that islands, 
however small, are capable of appropriation.  By contrast, low-tide elevations cannot be 
appropriated”.195   
 In the dispute between the Philippines and China over Scarborough Shoal, the 
very geographical nature of the feature is contested.  The Philippines has emphatically 
stated, “Bajo de Masinloc (Scarborough Shoal) is not an island….Bajo de Masinloc is a 
ring-shaped coral reef, which has several rocks encircling a lagoon.”196  China has 
asserted the position that Scarborough Shoal is Huang Yung Island which it has always 
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had historic sovereignty over it.
197
  If an independent assessment of Scarborough Shoal 
found it to be a low-tide elevation then it would appear acquisition of it by any sovereign 
would be impossible and China’s claim to acquisition by historic title would be 
delegitimized.  
 In light of the foregoing considerations, China cannot demonstrate that it has 
historic title in the South China Sea.  Despite broad claims of rights over the islands of 
the South China Sea, the historical record, as discussed above, is more nuanced and 
reflects a long history of the region being dominated by sea-faring traders who did not 
necessarily demonstrate significant territorial aspirations for China in the South China 
Sea.  As discussed above, the Spratly Islands and Paracel Islands have an extensive 
history of not being dominated by any one country to the exclusion of all others.  In the 
Paracel Islands, China only was able to achieve consolidation of authority over the 
islands by the forcible eviction of South Vietnam in 1974.
198
   
 The history of the past eighty years of competing claims, partial occupation of 
islands, operational confrontations and routine diplomatic protests all combine to prevent 
China from successfully proving it has historical title to the regions islands (and other 
formations) based solely on historic evidence.   
VI.  ASEAN’S ROLE IN SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
 The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is a regional organization 
that provides an existing framework in which South China Sea claimant states can 
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peacefully resolve their disputes.
199
   This section will examine the relationship between 
China and fellow ASEAN states, the relative position of ASEAN states on the South 
China Sea disputes and efforts to date by ASEAN to peacefully resolve the disputes. 
 The historical relationship between China and neighboring states has been one of 
suspicion and mistrust that Communist China represented a danger to the existing 
regional regimes; in particular Indonesia attributed China’s support to the failed 1965 
Communist coup in that country.
200
  Compounding the regional frustration with China 
has been China’s repeated insistence over the past two decades that the South China Sea 
dispute can only be resolved through bilateral negotiations, notwithstanding the 
multilateral nature of the sovereignty issues.
201
  The result of this historical mistrust has 
been that no substantive negotiations between China and any of the Southeast Asian 
claimants have occurred during the past two decades.
202
  The other claimant states have 
engaged in bilateral negotiations with each other, but China has been the primary 
proponent of bilateral instead of multilateral negotiations.
203
  
 The lack of substantive negotiations by ASEAN member states, “can largely be 
attributed to power asymmetries, a perceived lack of sincerity on China’s part, the 
absence of effective diplomatic mechanisms and, most recently, hardening positions by 
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the major players.”204  Of all the regional claimant states,  
only Vietnam and China have established a formal mechanism to address the 
dispute.  In 1994, they established a joint working group to discuss maritime 
disputes in the South China Sea.  Past bilateral negotiations between China and 
Vietnam have successfully resolved disputes, including issues related to the land 
border and the Gulf of Tonkin.
205
  
 However, as a general rule regional states resent China’s insistence on a bilateral 
approach, fearing that China as the strongest party will engage in a divide and rule 
approach.
206
  Further, it can be safely assumed that China would only support bilateral 
negotiations in which it is one of the parties, but would be unlikely to recognize the 




 China has consistently rejected involvement from outside the region in the South 
China Sea disputes, including by the United States.  After U.S. Secretary of State Hillary 
Clinton’s 2010 affirmation of freedom of navigation in the South China Sea as a vital 
U.S. national interest, China followed a policy seeking to discourage United States 
involvement and the internationalization of the claims in the South China Sea out of fear 
that China would be isolated and hindered from achieving the outcome it desires.
208
  
 Against this backdrop of China’s general policy of unwillingness to engage in 
multilateral dispute resolution regarding South China Sea issues, there has been a subtle 
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shift in China’s engagement policy of the last two decades.  The origin of the change 
could be rooted in the crushing of the Tiananmen Square democracy protests, which 
proved a foreign relations debacle for China.
209
  Regardless, China adopted a less 
confrontational approach in the early 1990s and the only feature China has occupied in 
the Spratly Island group since that time was the Philippines-claimed Mischief Reef in 
1995 (though China has continued to consolidate its presence in the features it does 
control in the Spratly Islands).
210
  
 In line with this less confrontational approach, China inaugurated in the early 
1990s a new relationship with ASEAN.  ASEAN seeks to promote, “the twin goals of 
Southeast Asian autonomy and ASEAN’s centrality in the region’s security affairs.”211  
In furtherance of the goal of Southeast Asian autonomy, ASEAN adopted the Treaty of 
Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia in 1976.
212
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 In order to enhance Southeast Asian security, ASEAN initiated the ASEAN 
Regional Forum in 1994, the East Asia Summit in 2005, the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ 
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 ASEAN member states can be divided into different groups depending on how 
they view South China Sea sovereignty claims.  The first group would be the claimant 
states of Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei.  This group could be further 
sub-divided into active claimants (Vietnam and the Philippines) and quieter claimants 
(Malaysia and Brunei).
214
   Vietnam and the Philippines are the most vigorous claimant 
states in the sovereignty disputes with China having higher tensions and a more charged 
political atmosphere.
215
  Malaysia and Brunei have been more reluctant to confront China 
over disputed sovereignty in the South China Sea, but have challenged China on occasion 
such as the 2009 joint Vietnam-Malaysia claim on the extended continental shelf.
216
  
 The remaining ASEAN states are non-claimants in the South China Sea dispute 
and can be divided into a group actively engaged on the issues (Indonesia, Singapore and 
Thailand) and a disengaged group (Cambodia, Burma and Laos).
217
  Indonesia is 
historically the most actively involved non-claimant state and since 1990 has hosted 
workshops focused on managing South China Sea disputes.
218
  The disengaged ASEAN 
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group is distinguished by their close relations with China, “which usually discourages 
non-claimants from involvement in the disputes”.219 
 In the mid-1990s China was first invited to be a consultative partner with ASEAN 
and in 1996 was made a full dialogue partner.
220
  Subsequently, China was a founding 
participant in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), which engages in dialogue on political 
and security matters with both ASEAN members and non-ASEAN participants including 
the United States, Russia, Japan and Australia.
221
  Another key development for China 
within the ASEAN framework was the inauguration of the ASEAN-China dialogue, 
which represented the first time China had consented to multilateral negotiations.
222
 
 China’s relationship with ASEAN has been at times strained.  In the late 1990s 
ASEAN sought to defuse tensions over the 1995 Mischief Reef confrontation by 
developing a Code of Conduct for the South China Sea.
223
  The proposed code was 
viewed as a useful conflict management tool that in the future might create an 
environment conducive to resolution of the sovereignty claims.
224
  ASEAN invited China 
in 1999 to participate in negotiations for development of the code but China rejected the 
invitation relying upon the 1997 ASEAN-China Joint Statement as representing the 
highest-level political dialogue on the issue.
225
   
 China subsequently changed position and participated in the ASEAN negotiations 
resulting in an ASEAN Declaration on November 4, 2002.  ASEAN’s 10 member states 
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and China signed in Phnom Penh, Cambodia a non-binding “Declaration on the Conduct 
of Parties in the South China Sea”(DOC).226  One of the asserted successes of China 
during the negotiations was having the document described as a “Declaration” rather than 
a “Code” to further emphasize its political rather than legal nature.227  The Declaration on 
Conduct provided in part that the parties to it would,  
[R]eaffirm their commitment to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the 
United Nations, the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, the Treaty of 
Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, the Five Principles of Peaceful 
Coexistence, and other universally recognized principles of international law 
which shall serve as the basic norms governing state-to-state relations;  
The Parties reaffirm their respect for and commitment to the freedom of 
navigation in and overflight above the South China Sea as provided for by the 
universally recognized principles of international law, including the 1982 UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea;  
The Parties concerned undertake to resolve their territorial and jurisdictional 
disputes by peaceful means, without resorting to the threat or use of force, 
through friendly consultations and negotiations by sovereign states directly 
concerned, in accordance with universally recognized principles of international 
law, including the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea;  
The Parties undertake to exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that 
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would complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability including, 
among others, refraining from action of inhabiting on the presently uninhabited 




While the Declaration on Conduct had high aspirations, the declaration suffered from the 
fact that it was not a binding treaty, it had no enforcement provisions for violations and it 
failed to specify geographic scope.
229
 
 The Declaration on Conduct ushered in a period of relative calm and stability in 
the South China Sea with no state taking actions to antagonize other claimant states.  
Reflective of this more cooperative environment, China acceded in 2003 to the ASEAN 
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation.
230
  But the relative calm of the first few years 
following the Declaration on Conduct also represented a period when little progress was 
made towards implementing the provisions of the Declaration.  The state parties to the 
Declaration had agreed to “reaffirm their commitment to sincerely and faithfully 
implement the DOC in order to contribute to regional peace and stability in the South 
China Sea.”231  The main task of the ASEAN-China joint working group is “to study and 
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recommend measures to translate the provisions of the DOC into concrete cooperative 
activities that will enhance mutual understanding and trust.”232 
 It was not until 2004 that senior officials agreed to establish a joint working group 
 to draw up implementation guidelines.  Over the next four years, this group met 
 only three times – in 2005, in 2006 and, informally, in 2008 – and it failed to 
 reach a consensus on the way forward.
233
   
The stumbling block to development of guidelines to implement the Declaration on 
Conduct was China’s unwillingness to deal with ASEAN collectively on the issue and its 
preference to deal bilaterally with claimant states.
234
  
 In July 2011 ASEAN and China finally agreed to guidelines to implement the 
Declaration on Conduct.
235
  The agreed implementation guidelines are extremely vague 
and state “that the DOC will be implemented in a “step-by-step” manner, that 
participation in cooperative projects will be voluntary and the CBMs [confidence 
building measures] will be decided by consensus.  In short, the guidelines do not go 
beyond similar clauses contained in the DOC.”236  The implementing guidelines 
specifically avoided addressing sovereignty issues, which ASEAN member states 
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appeared to think would be better addressed in a treaty-like Code of Conduct.
237
  
 ASEAN member states viewed the implementing guidelines as a step towards a 
formal, binding code of conduct, but China did not see it as a natural evolution and 
preferred to just focus on implementing the Declaration on Conduct.
238
  Despite China’s 
opposition, ASEAN began discussing a Code of Conduct in November 2011 and the 
Philippines released its own draft Code of Conduct in January 2012.
239
    
 In January 2012, ASEAN and China commenced discussions in Beijing on the 
implementation of the DOC Guidelines.  The participants,  
agreed to set up four expert committees on maritime scientific research, 
environmental protection, search and rescue and transnational crime.  These 
committees were based on four of the five cooperative activities included in 
the 2002 DOC.  Significantly no expert committee on safety of navigation and 
communication at sea was established due to its contentious nature.  Not a 
single cooperative project has been undertaken.240 
  In July 2012, ASEAN’s foreign ministers met and released a six-point program 
intended to advance the negotiation process with China for a binding treaty-like Code of 
Conduct.  The ASEAN program emphasized commitment to implement the Declaration 
on Conduct, the guidelines on implementation of the declaration, respect for international 
law and UNCLOS, self-restraint and peaceful resolution of disputes in accordance with 
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  However, the ASEAN announcement on the Code of Conduct 
negotiation process was marred by the first instance of the member states not releasing a 
final summit communiqué due to vocal protests by the Philippines over the wording of 
the draft communiqué, which stated ASEAN participants had agreed not to 
internationalize the South China Sea issue.
242
   
 China has proceeded slowly and with caution towards negotiation of a binding 
Code of Conduct.  In August 2013, China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi, in a reflection of 
China’s cautious approach stated that China had “agreed to hold consultations on moving 
forward the process on the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea.”243  He further 
stated early agreement was unrealistic and set out four principles on China’s approach; 
(1) reasonable expectations; (2) consensus through negotiation; (3) elimination of 
interference; and (4) step by step approach. 
244
  
 A multitude of factors and an unwillingness of member states to cooperate on 
issues of joint concern have frequently resulted in ASEAN being unable to effectively 
address the disputes in the South China Sea.  However, despite ASEAN’s previous lack 
of success, the ASEAN organization does offer the best framework within which South 
China Sea claimant states can work with one another.  
VII.  CHINA’S MOTIVATIONS FOR PACIFIC SETTLEMENT 
 There are a number of compelling reasons why China should be willing to reach a 
comprehensive settlement under the auspices of ASEAN with other South China Sea 
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claimant states.  In this section the economic, national security and liability concerns that 
give China incentive to negotiate a comprehensive settlement will be given consideration.  
A.  Economic Factors 
 One of the most compelling arguments in favor of China settling disputes with her 
neighbors is the impact that these disputes can and will have on economic relations 
within the Southeast Asian region.  “Regional integration between China and the states of 
Southeast Asia is a priority for China, as part of its overall policy of peaceful rise.
245
  The 
peaceful rise policy,  
 also referred to as "peaceful development," states that China will develop 
 economically by taking advantage of the peaceful international environment, and 
 at the same time maintain and contribute to world peace by its development. 
 The policy was articulated by Chinese leaders in 2003 to counter international 




“Regional integration with other South China Sea states, therefore, has both political and 
economic aspects.  To achieve growth, it is helpful for a state to have peaceful borders so 
that resources can be channeled into economic development rather than armies and 
border defense systems.”247  The relatively small size of each of the Southeast Asian 
countries belies the fact that they collectively represent a fast growing economy with a 
combined population of 580 million people.
248
  Trade between China and ASEAN 
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countries has soared from as little as $8 billion U.S. dollars in 1991 to $231 billion U.S. 
dollars in 2008.
249
  The economic incentive for China to maintain good relations with her 
neighbors is therefore quite high and very real.  The leaders of Southeast Asian states are 
not entirely oblivious to the risks and challenges that the economic power of a rising 
China represents.  The former Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew asserted in 1996 
that states should, “engage, not contain China, but also quietly set pieces into place for a 
fall-back position should China not play in accordance with the rules as a good global 
citizen.”250  A threat remains that China could pursue South China Sea claims too 
vigorously resulting in regional states initiating an economic boycott of China’s products.  
A foreshadowing of the type of economic damage that could result from unchecked 
political ambitions can be seen in the frayed relations between China and Japan.  Since 
2012 when a dispute erupted over the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands in China) in the 
East China Sea, trade between China and Japan dropped 3.9% in 2012 and a further 5.1% 
in 2013.
251
   
 In addition to the prospect of an economic boycott that China and neighboring 
states can ill afford, the ongoing unresolved sovereignty issues have impeded economic 
exploitation of resources in the South China Sea.  The continental shelf of the Spratly 
Islands contains significant deposits of unexploited hydrocarbons estimated up to 5.4 
billion barrels of oil and 55.1 trillion cubic feet of natural gas.
252
   China has taken a hard-
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line approach on energy development by other regional States; “China’s Foreign Ministry 
reiterated on Tuesday that China opposed oil and gas development by other countries in 
disputed waters of the sea.”253  In light of this inflexible position, the hydrocarbon energy 
reserves in the South China Sea remain unexploited and unavailable to promote vital 
economic development in Southeast Asian economies.
254
  
B.  National Security Implications 
 A second and equally important factor that should compel China to alter current 
position and assume a more conciliatory approach is the national security implications of 
the current approach to the South China Sea. “China’s…objective appears to be to 
enhance its control over the South China Sea in order to create a maritime security buffer 
zone that protects the major population centers, industry, and rich cultural sites of 
China’s developed eastern coastal area.”255  In furtherance of this objective, China has 
implemented a policy in recent years of expanding military holdings in the South China 
Sea.  “In 2012, China expelled Filipino fishermen from traditional fishing grounds around 
Scarborough Shoal, less than 125 miles from the main Philippine islands, and has used its 
coast guard to maintain control.  In 2012, it established an administrative and military 
district covering portions of the claimed Paracel Islands.”256  China recently announced a 
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12.2% increase in defense spending to $131.6 billion U.S. dollars for modernization of its 
forces and enhanced defense of its land, sea and air territory.
257
  
 China’s increased military spending and posturing fails to take into account the 
security needs and concerns of its regional neighbors.  A more assertive China creates the 
risk of a regional arms race. “China’s increased spending will alarm neighbors and has 
already prompted some, such as Vietnam and Japan, to boost their own military 
budgets”.258  The potential for a regional arms race also naturally creates the potential for 
armed conflict in the South China Sea.  “The conflict would be either planned or 
unplanned, and involve, initially, either China and the U.S. or China and a Southeast Asia 
state.”259  In the event of a regional conflict in which China was viewed as an aggressor, 
the credibility of China as a major world power who adheres to international norms on 
peaceful resolution of disputes would be undermined.
260
  A regional conflict also creates 
the risk of United States involvement if a U.S. defense treaty partner is involved.  The 
most significant defense treaty relationship is the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty between 
the United States and the Philippines.  The treaty provides, “Each Party recognizes that 
an armed attack in the Pacific Area on either of the Parties would be dangerous to its own 
peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common dangers in 
accordance with its constitutional processes.”261  The common defense obligation under 
the Mutual Defense Treaty was recently reaffirmed by U.S. Secretary of State Hillary 
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Clinton on November 16, 2011 at a ceremony onboard the USS Fitzgerald in Manila 
Bay.
262
   
 In light of the potential for an unintentional conflict, China could find itself in the 
position of experiencing both military losses and a loss of international credibility.  An 
issue related to risks associated with China’s military expansion is the controversial 
position China has taken regarding military activities in the exclusive economic zone.   
China’s exclusive economic zone policies have been described by some observers as, 
“the most expansive security and sovereignty EEZ claim on the planet – a serial violator 
of the regime of high seas freedoms in the zone, China purports to regulate military 
activities, hydrographic surveys, and laying of cables and pipelines.”263   Another scholar 
in discussing the UNCLOS negotiation history on military activities in the exclusive 
economic zone has stated, “at UNCLOS III unsuccessful proposals were made to restrict 
the holding of foreign military exercises in the EEZ despite the highly held view that 
such exercises fell under the freedom of navigation concept.  The Convention includes no 
such limitation.”264   
 While China has sought to restrict military activities in its exclusive economic 
zone, observers have noted that it has shown no such restraint in engaging in military 
activities in the exclusive economic zones of other nations.  “Maritime legal scholars and 
some of China's neighbors have catalogued through open sources a series of PRC state 
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actions in recent years where China's military forces have repeatedly operated in waters 
off the coast of third-party nations like Japan and the Philippines.”265   
 The national security risk China takes in pursuing an aggressive policy on 
sovereignty in the South China Sea is that it may ultimately find itself constrained by 
neighboring States that adopt similar positions.  “China’s maritime geography is quite 
constrained, with access to the Pacific Ocean partially blocked by the first island chain, 
which leaves too few exits to the open sea.  The straits, channels, and EEZs overlapping 
the exits to the open sea are controlled by other nations.”266  If regional states were 
provoked into adopting hard-line positions, China “would not be able to even enter the 
open sea without the consent of neighboring coastal states.”267  The most prudent course 
of action would be for China to recognize that adopting a more conciliatory attitude 
towards other regional states and avoiding an arms build-up is vital to avoid an 
unnecessary conflict or being militarily constrained.  
C.  Litigation Concerns 
 A third reason for China to seek to a settlement in the South China Sea is pending 
litigation with the Philippines before a special arbitral panel under Annex VII of 
UNCLOS as well as the potential for future litigation between China and other regional 
states. The first portion of this section will consider the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction in 
the current Philippine case followed by a consideration of potential litigation risks based 
on China’s current policies in the South China Sea.   
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 As discussed earlier, on January 22, 2013, the Philippines informed China by a 
note verbale it was instituting arbitral proceedings “before an Arbitral Tribunal under 
Article 287 and Annex VII of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS) in order to achieve a peaceful and durable solution to the dispute over the 
West Philippine Sea (WPS)”.268  The Philippines asserted that China’s claimed nine-dash 
line is contrary to UNCLOS.  The Philippines further asserted China unlawfully has “laid 
claim to, occupied and built structures on certain submerged banks, reefs and low tide 
elevations that do not qualify as islands under UNCLOS, but are part of the Philippine 
continental shelf”.269 Finally, the Philippines claimed “China has occupied small, 
uninhabitable coral projections that are barely above water at high tide, and which are 
rocks under Article 121 (3) of UNCLOS…and that China has interfered with the lawful 
exercise by the Philippines of its rights within its legitimate maritime zones.”270    
 The Philippines asserted the arbitral tribunal has jurisdiction, because  “the 
dispute is about the interpretation and application by States Parties of their obligations 
under the UNCLOS” and Article 287 (1) of UNCLOS provides that “settlement of 
disputes concerning the interpretation and application of this Convention” may be 
referred by the Parties for resolution under Part XV of UNCLOS.”271  Further, “the 
Philippines is conscious of China’s Declaration of August 25, 2006 under Article 298 of 
UNCLOS [regarding optional exceptions to the compulsory proceedings], and has 
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avoided raising subjects or making claims that China has, by virtue of that Declaration, 
excluded from arbitral jurisdiction.”272 
 China’s response to the Philippines notification came on February 20, 2013 in 
which China’s Foreign Ministry stated,  
China's position on the South China Sea issue is clear and consistent. China's 
sovereignty over the Nansha Islands and their adjacent waters is based on 
sufficient historical and jurisprudential evidence…The Philippines' note and its 
attached notice not only violate the consensus, but also contain serious errors in 
fact and law as well as false accusations against China, which we firmly oppose. 
Chinese Ambassador to the Philippines Ma Keqing called a meeting with officials 
of the Philippine Foreign Ministry today, made clear that China refused to accept 
the note and its attached notice and returned them.
273
 
 China has taken a consistent position since that date it will not participate in the 
arbitral proceedings and declined to appoint an arbitrator to the tribunal.  “On 19 
February, China stated its rejection of the request for arbitration by the Philippines and 
returned the latter's note verbale and the attached notification.  The position of China, as 
indicated above, will not change.”274 
 UNCLOS provides under Art. 287 four means for settlement of disputes;  (1) the 
international tribunal for the law of the sea established in accordance with Annex VI;  (2) 
the International Court of Justice;  (3) an arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with 
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Annex VII; and  (4) a special arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with Annex VIII 
for one or more of the categories of disputes specified.
275
  If the states have not made an 
election of dispute resolution procedures or have opted for different dispute resolution 
procedures then any claims go to the ad hoc arbitration under Annex VIII.
276
  Further, 
under UNCLOS Art. 298, a state may opt out of compulsory arbitration proceedings 
concerning sea boundary delimitations or those concerning historic bays and titles, 




 China and the Philippines have not exercised an option under Article 287 
regarding dispute settlement forum, so each State is deemed to have accepted Annex VII 
arbitration.
278
  However, in 2006 China did make a declaration under Article 298 that it 
“does not accept any of the procedures provided for in Section 2 of Part XV of the 
Convention with respect to all the categories of disputes referred to in paragraph 1(a) (b) 
and (c).”279  
 China has rested its objections to the compulsory arbitration proceedings on two 
grounds.  First, the request for arbitration proceedings are, “essentially concerned with 
maritime delimitation between the two countries…and thus involve the territorial 
sovereignty over certain relevant islands and reefs”, which per China’s declaration in 
2006 are excluded from the compulsory dispute settlement procedures.
280
  Second, the 
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Philippines by commencing arbitration proceedings has violated the consensus between 
China and ASEAN member states to directly negotiate the relevant dispute and that this 
is stipulated in the Declaration on Conduct.
281
 
 China’s argument that “the Philippines case primarily deals with a territorial 
dispute over which the tribunal has no jurisdiction is likely not to be accepted by the 
tribunal.”282  The Philippines in crafting its notification chose to focus on China’s nine-
dash line as contrary to UNCLOS but did not treat it as a maritime boundary dispute.  
China could assert the nine-dash line is a territorial boundary, but this disagreement of 
perspective alone would be sufficient to trigger jurisdiction for the arbitral panel.
283
  
Also, the Philippines does not seek a declaration of sovereignty over the islands and 
maritime zones, but rather seeks a ruling that China has illegally interfered with the 
Philippines maritime spaces and right of navigation.
284
  UNCLOS Art. 297 specifically 
provides that disputes concerning the application of the Convention shall be subject to the 
procedures, “when it is alleged that a coastal state has acted in contravention of the 
provisions of this Convention in regard to freedoms and rights of navigation”.285  
 China’s second basis for objecting the tribunal’s jurisdiction, which asserts that 
the Philippines violated the China–ASEAN consensus on direct negotiation of the dispute 
may also fail to persuade the tribunal.  China rests its argument on a provision in 
UNCLOS Art. 283 which states, “when a dispute arises between State Parties concerning 
the interpretation or application of the Convention, the parties to the dispute shall proceed 
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expeditiously to an exchange of views regarding its settlement by negotiation or other 
peaceful means.” 286  However, the Philippines is not obliged to continue negotiations 
with China if, “one party concludes that all possibilities of settlement have been 
exhausted.”287   
 A second avenue of pursuit for China would be to rely upon UNCLOS Article 
281, which states,  
 If the State Parties which are parties to a dispute concerning the interpretation or 
 application of this Convention have agreed to seek settlement of the dispute by a 
 peaceful means of their own choice, the procedures provided for in this part apply 
 only where no settlement has been reached by recourse to such means and the 
 agreement between the parties does not exclude any further procedure.
288
  
China could argue that the 2002 Declaration on Conduct in the South China Sea is an 
agreement under Art. 281that excludes compulsory arbitration. 
289
  However, the 2002 
Declaration on Conduct does not provide for a dispute resolution mechanism and the 
declaration was non-binding in nature.
290
  Thus, there is a strong Philippines argument 
that the Declaration on Conduct is not an agreement within the meaning of UNCLOS Art. 
281 requiring continued negotiations and the Philippines could unilaterally refer the 
matter to arbitration.  Based upon the above, it would be highly unlikely that China 
would be able to avoid jurisdiction under UNCLOS Art. 298 grounds.    
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 Non-participation by China represents an unnecessary risk that the Philippines 
could fully or partially obtain a favorable judgment from the tribunal that would damage 
China’s reputation and delegitimize China’s claims in the South China Sea.  The default 
appearance of a party does not prevent the proceedings from continuing (but also does 
not result in an automatic adverse ruling).
291
  If in the face of an unfavorable ruling, 
China took the more radical step of withdrawing from UNCLOS, it would not affect the 
current proceedings with the Philippines.  “Proceedings in accordance with the 
Convention which are pending when the Convention terminates for a party to the dispute 
following denunciation are not affected by the denunciation.”292  
 The participation of China in the proceedings “may be conducive to the creation 
of a positive atmosphere for cooperative settlement of the dispute” and result in 
termination of the proceedings.
293
  “Under Article 105 of the (ITLOS) Rules, the 
proceedings are discontinued if the parties, either jointly or separately, notify the tribunal 
in writing that they have agreed to discontinue the proceedings.  This possibility exists up 
until the final judgment on the merits has been delivered”.294  This occurred in the MOX 
Plant Case in which Ireland notified the tribunal that it was withdrawing its claim against 




 Therefore in order to avoid the arbitral tribunal establishing jurisdiction over the 
Philippines claims and proceeding to a ruling, which could be unfavorable to China, the 
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more prudent course of action would be for China to participate in the proceedings.  
China could then seek to either have the Philippines withdraw the claims in return for a 
negotiated settlement or China could argue the merits of its legal position while fully 
operating within the UNCLOS framework.   
 In addition to the risks posed by the arbitral tribunal finding jurisdiction over the 
Philippines claims, China also faces litigation risks due to what some commentators have 
observed as China’s current policies in the South China Sea regarding the right of 
navigation.   
Chinese ships and aircraft have harassed numerous U.S. naval ships and aircraft 
operating beyond the Chinese territorial sea and airspace in the….South China 
Sea.  Japanese, Australian, Malaysian, British, and Indian warships have been 
similarly harassed.  Chinese government vessels also have interfered with 
Vietnamese and Filipino resource exploration and exploitation activities within 
their respective exclusive economic zones.
296
    
A recent incident indicative of this pattern of conduct occurred on January 27, 2014 in the 




 Freedom of navigation of all states in the exclusive economic zone and highs seas 
is a fundamental right guaranteed by UNCLOS.
298
  The right of navigation includes the 
right to pass through the oceans unhindered by other states, subject to certain constraints 
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relating to the contiguous zone and exclusive economic zone.
299
  The right of freedom of 
navigation was primarily codified in UNCLOS Articles 58, 87 and 90.
300
  The other right 
of freedom of navigation is the exclusive jurisdiction of the flag state to exercise 
jurisdiction over a vessel of its nationality, though subject to some exceptions.
301
  While 
freedom of navigation has always held a prominent position in international law, it has 
not been an unfettered right and has always been subject to restrictions.  The primary 
state concern has been fear of lawlessness and insecurity on the high seas.
302
  The 
primary bases for interference with free navigation have been suspected piracy, slave 
trade and ships flying more than one flag.
303
   
 The legal authority of a state to interfere with freedom of navigation in the 
exclusive economic zone and high seas is assessed under a test of reasonableness.
304
  A 
determination that state conduct was unreasonable without any resulting consequences 
would render the right of freedom of navigation meaningless.  “States are likely to use 
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their powers with caution as they may risk having to compensate the vessel for loss or 
damage sustained by unjustifiable enforcement action.”305 
 The right of compensation for unreasonable interference with the right of 
navigation is codified in UNCLOS Art. 101, which states, “If the suspicions prove to be 
unfounded, and provided the ship boarded has not committed any act justifying them, it 
shall be compensated for any loss or damage that may have been sustained.”306  
UNCLOS Art. 110 provides, “where a ship has been stopped or arrested outside the 
territorial sea in circumstances, which do not justify the exercise of the right of hot 
pursuit, it shall be compensated for any loss or damage that may have been thereby 
sustained.”307  The flag state of the vessel holds the right to seek compensation for 
wrongful interference, “since the freedom of navigation constitutes an exclusive right of 
the flag state and since this right is so closely linked to any right to compensation in cases 
of interferences on the high seas”.308 
 China’s actions of restricting military activity in its claimed exclusive economic 
zone, prohibiting survey activity in the disputed exclusive economic zone with Vietnam 
and restricting Philippine access to the vicinity of Scarborough Shoal creates a risk that a 
regional state or outside maritime power will challenge China’s actions as an 
unreasonable interference with freedom of navigation under UNCLOS.  In the event that 
China (unrelated to the prevention of illegal fishing in the exclusive economic zone) 
unreasonably harassed, boarded or detained the crew of a foreign vessel, such as the 
previously mentioned 2009 harassment of the civilian Vietnamese survey vessel, a state 
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could conceivably bring a claim seeking damages under UNCLOS Articles 101 and 
110.
309
  An arbitral tribunal under UNCLOS Annex VII would have jurisdiction over the 
claim of unreasonable interference with freedom of navigation (if the claim did not fall 
within the small number of exceptions claimed by China under Article 298).
310
  In such a 
case for unreasonable interference with the right of navigation, China potentially could 
lose and be required to pay damages.  The effect of an arbitral loss on China would be to 
needlessly damage China’s international reputation.  China’s ability to state that it is a 
good state actor that adheres to public international law would be undermined.  Also, the 
success of one state in bringing a claim may encourage other similarly situated states to 
seek compensation.    
 The double prospect of the arbitral tribunal finding jurisdiction over the 
Philippines claim against China and the potential that another regional state will seek 
compensation at an arbitral tribunal under UNCLOS Articles 101 and 110 provide 
sufficient incentive for China to reassess its current policies and actions.  In light of the 
above litigation considerations, China may want to adopt a more conciliatory approach 
towards other regional states, working within the UNCLOS treaty framework and seek a 
settlement to South China Sea claims.   
VIII. JOINT DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENTS AND A CODE OF CONDUCT 
 The prospects for an unfavorable arbitral tribunal ruling, the continued constraints 
on exploitation of natural resources in the South China Sea and the ongoing negative 
impact on ASEAN member state relations all provide incentives for China to seek some 
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form of settlement with other South China Sea claimant nations.  This section will 
consider a framework for settlement in the form of a broad South China Sea joint 
development agreement and conclusion of the proposed binding ASEAN Code of 
Conduct to address sovereignty disputes over the islands and waters of the South China 
Sea.  
A.  Joint Development Agreements 
 The best prospect for settlement of the disputes is to follow the advice of the late 
Deng Xiaoping, who in 1988, in addressing the ongoing dispute with the Philippines 
stated, “In view of the friendly relations between our two countries, we can set aside this 
issue for the time being and take the approach of pursuing joint development."
311
  Under 
China’s approach,  
The concept of "setting aside dispute and pursuing joint development" has four 
elements; (1) The sovereignty of the territories concerned belongs to China;  (2) 
When conditions are not ripe to bring about a thorough solution to territorial 
dispute, discussion on the issue of sovereignty may be postponed so that the 
dispute is set aside.  To set aside dispute does not mean giving up sovereignty.  It 
is just to leave the dispute aside for the time being;  (3) The territories under 
dispute may be developed in a joint way; (4) The purpose of joint development is 
to enhance mutual understanding through cooperation and create conditions for 
the eventual resolution of territorial ownership. 
312
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 China reiterated in 2011 calls for joint development of oil, gas and other resources 
in areas disputed with the Philippines but offered no flexibility on sovereignty claims.
313
  
While China, like other claimant states, will need to limit its claims of entitlement in the 
South China Sea, provisional arrangements such as a joint development zone of resources 
would be a good starting point.
314
 
 The legal basis for promoting the creation of zones of cooperation can be found in 
UNCLOS Articles 74 and 83, which address provisional agreements concerning the 
delimitation of exclusive economic zone and continental shelf.
315
   
Pending agreement as provided…the states concerned, in a spirit of understanding 
and cooperation, shall make every effort to enter into provisional arrangements of 
a practical nature and, during this transitional period, not to jeopardize or hamper 
the reaching of the final agreement.  Such arrangements shall be without prejudice 
to the final delimitation.
316
 
 States “may decide to establish co-operative arrangements for the exploitation and 
management of the resources of the delimitation area either in place of a boundary or to 
facilitate the drawing or continuing of a boundary.”317  The co-operative arrangements 
can take several forms with one of the most attractive in a disputed sovereignty area 
being a “co-operative arrangement for the exploitation of seabed and fishing resources in 
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place of a boundary line.”318  There have been several instances of this type of 
arrangement being established with the most prominent being the 1974 agreement 
between South Korea and Japan on joint development of the northern portion of the 
continental shelf between the two countries.
319
  “The agreement, which is to last for fifty 
years and applies to an areas of some 24,000 square nautical miles, provides that 
concessionaires from each party are to enter into operating agreements to carry out joint 
exploration and exploitation of the area”.320  The agreement established a joint 
commission to administer the exploration and exploitation of the area.
321
 
 China has some history in establishing a joint co-operative agreement with a 
neighboring state, so the conclusion of such an agreement with the Philippines and 
Vietnam would not be entirely unprecedented.  In June 2008, China and Japan reached a 
significant agreement in the dispute over hydrocarbon resources in the East China Sea.
322
  
The 2008 agreement concerned joint development in the northern part of the East China 
Sea, continued commitment to talks to attain development in other areas of the East 
China Sea and Japanese participation in development of the existing Shirakaba 
(Chunxiao) oil and gas field.  The agreement was premised on the idea that it did not 
prejudice the legal position of either side concerning final maritime delimitation.
323
 
 While the 2008 Japan–China agreement in the East China Sea represents a 
positive precedent for China to resolve peacefully development of natural resources in 
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disputed areas, it must be viewed with a degree of caution since, “ In the last three years, 
there has been little progress in the bilateral follow-up talks on the basis of the agreement, 
reportedly due to the cautious attitude of the Chinese side.”324  Also, the legal nature of 
the 2008 agreement is unclear, since it was not signed by each nation’s representatives, 
has been described by China as a principled consensus (rather than an international 
agreement) and the agreement does not have a date of entry into force.
325
  
 The only other significant step by China towards such joint development is the 
2005 Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking (JMSU) between China, the Philippines and 
Vietnam.
326
  The JMSU provided for a three-year period to conduct seismic studies in the 
South China Sea in order to identify areas of oil and gas exploration.
327
  The JMSU 




 While the negotiations for a joint development arrangement in the South China 
Sea would be difficult, “The starting point for any consideration of joint development 
should always be a thorough understanding of the overlapping claims.”329  The joint 
development process would be furthered if states brought their maritime zone claims into 
conformity with UNCLOS, so that areas of overlapping claims are clarified and the stage 
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is properly set for negotiations on provisional joint development areas.
330
  Next, “a 
consensus must emerge on the location, size and shape of the area to be jointly 
developed.”331  China potentially could enter into joint development in particular areas of 
the South China Sea, including “Reed Bank with the Philippines, Brunei-Shaba Basin and 
James Shoal Basin with Malaysia or Brunei, and North and West Vanguard Bank with 
Vietnam.”332  Prospects for cooperative arrangements would also be possible in the 
vicinity of Scarborough Shoal and to a lesser extent the Paracel Islands.  The Philippines 
and China could negotiate an agreement to share fishery resources within 12 nautical 
miles of Scarborough Shoal (based on the assumption that it is a rock entitled to only a 
territorial sea within the meaning of UNCLOS Art. 121).  They could employ common 
regulations on fishing and implement seasonal fishing bans to conserve stock for each 
country.
333
  The Paracel Islands would prove more problematic due to China’s current 




 Once the relevant states have agreed upon the area to be jointly developed the 
next important issue is the basis for sharing revenue.  The typical agreement has involved 
an equal division of the revenues.
335
  The states must then agree on the structural model 
for the joint development agreement.  The three generally recognized forms are; (1) 
single-state model (in which one state manages the joint development area on behalf of 
all states);  (2) the joint venture model (the states form compulsory joint ventures to 
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exploit resources); and (3) the joint authority model (an institutional framework for a 
joint authority with delegated powers to manage the resources is established).
336
  There is 
no preferred form for a joint development agreement, so the states can tailor it according 
the circumstances of the underlying dispute.
337
  Other common terms addressed in joint 
development agreements are the law to apply to the area, the duration of the agreement, 
termination, dispute resolution, environmental and health issues, taxation, preservation of 
territorial rights in future delimitation disputes, fisheries, customs and immigration.
338
  
 In situations such as the South China Sea disputes, where China and the other 
claimant states are not prepared to allow any one country to have a disproportionate level 
of control or influence, the joint authority model is the most attractive comprehensive 
joint development model.  However, “significant expertise is required to develop a stand-
alone oil and regulatory framework” and this will often cause negotiation of the joint 
development agreement to be time-consuming and difficult.
339
 
B.  Code of Conduct 
 Once joint development agreements have been initiated in disputed areas, China 
and other claimant states could turn to addressing other mechanisms for dispute 
resolution within the ASEAN framework.  While in the past ASEAN has contributed 
ineffectual statements on the South China Sea dispute, ASEAN’s proposed binding Code 
of Conduct presents the best key elements for comprehensive settlement of the dispute.
340
  
There have been some recent encouraging signs regarding the prospects for a binding 
                                                        
336
 Id. at 145.  
337




 Id.  
340
 RAINE & LEMIERE, supra note 15, at 130.  
 71 
Code of Conduct with a recent meeting resulting in a Chinese statement about “gradual 
progress and consensus through consultation”341  While relying upon ASEAN for the 
political framework for a comprehensive settlement, there is no need to duplicate a legal 
framework, because “UNCLOS provides an integrated legal framework on which to build 
sound and effective regulations for the different uses of the ocean.”342 
 As an initial matter, ASEAN should form a multinational independent panel of 
legal and technical experts drawn from academia, governmental and non-governmental 
entities to consider equitable delimitation of territorial disputes in the South China Sea.
343
  
The independent panel at minimum should contain representatives from China, the 
Philippines and Vietnam with the balance of representatives coming from neutral 
ASEAN member states such as Indonesia or Singapore.  Further, the panel should contain 
an odd number of members, perhaps five total, and any decision would be taken by 
majority vote.  The independent panel would determine sovereignty over islands, 
including rocks, and other maritime features.  After sovereignty determinations were 
reached then the independent panel could proceed to equitable delimitation of territorial 
seas and exclusive economic zones.  A provision could be agreed that if states did not 
accept the sovereignty determinations and maritime boundary delimitations of the 
independent panel then the dispute would be referred within a specific time period to an 
UNCLOS Annex VII arbitral tribunal.
344
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 Once the independent panel has initiated a process of equitable consideration of 
territorial claims and maritime delimitation, ASEAN could focus on other provisions for 
peaceful settlement.  One of the most important actions would be a multilateral 
agreement to demilitarize islands, including rocks, and other features in the South China 
Sea.  Removing the dispute from the sphere of regional militaries and making them a 
topic of civilian concern and control would aid in reducing hard-line attitudes.
345
  
 A legally binding ASEAN Code of Conduct should also address cooperation in 
other areas such as marine scientific research, marine pollution, fisheries management, 
search and rescue and anti-piracy.
346
  In the event of disputes regarding interpretation and 
application of the Code of Conduct, ASEAN could establish a dispute resolution 
mechanism but there is a danger of “too many organizations operating under the auspices 
of ASEAN”.347  Rather, ASEAN should instead utilize the existing UNCLOS dispute 
resolution framework, which represents the most practical and institutionally robust 
choice for resolution of disputes that arise under the Code of Conduct.
348
 
 While the implementation of complex regional joint development agreements and 
a binding Code of Conduct represent a significant challenge for the South China Sea 
claimant states, they present the best opportunity for a durable and equitable peace 
between China and other claimant states. 
IX.  CONCLUSION 
 China’s historic rights claims in the South China Sea based on assertions of 
historic waters or historic title are both unreasonably broad and lack legitimacy under 
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public international law.  While the sweep of China’s nine-dash line claim in the South 
China Sea is wide, it cannot reasonably be expected that any international tribunal or 
court would recognize sovereignty over the islands or rights in the waters based on the 
current historical record.  The historical evidence advanced by certain academics  (in 
support of contemporary historic rights) that trade and exploration by China several 
hundred years ago support China’s claims is weak at best.349  Of course, historical 
evidence offered by China should be considered in making sovereignty determinations, 
but rather than being the determinative factor, the historic evidence should merely be 
relevant to establishing whether China has exercised authority over the waters, islands, 
rocks and features of the South China Sea.
350
  
 In addition, the nine-dash line that China asserted in the 2009 note verbale 
appears to be based on historic rights that predate UNCLOS ratification in 1996 and are 
potentially contrary to China’s obligations under UNCLOS.351  China entered UNCLOS 
with the understanding that it was negotiated out of “the desire to settle, in the spirit of 
mutual understanding and cooperation, all issues relating to the law of the sea”.352  China 
in now asserting that UNCLOS does not restrain a historic rights claim threatens to 
undermine the entire legal regime established by UNCLOS.
353
 
 In light of this potential subversion of the entire UNCLOS legal regime and the 
thus far unpersuasive arguments put forward by China regarding its historic rights, the 
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concern arises as to what kind of major power does China intend to be.
354
  China has 
currently placed itself on a path of confrontation with other regional states and 
obstruction of any efforts at peaceful settlement of disputes in the South China Sea.  
However, China has the opportunity to cooperate with other regional states, within the 
ASEAN framework, to peacefully resolve long-standing disputes.  Perhaps echoing the 
hopeful sentiments of many ASEAN member states, President Obama stated in February 
2012, “we welcome China’s peaceful rise, that we believe that a strong and prosperous 
China is one that can help to bring stability and prosperity to the region and to the 
world”.355 
  In pursuing joint development arrangements and a legally binding Code of 
Conduct with South China Sea claimant states, China has a unique opportunity to 
reasonably manage the disputes in the South China Sea.  China can ensure that any 
maritime delimitation of disputed areas will be in accordance with the goal of equitable 
resolution and that China will equitably share in the natural resources of the region.   
 It is inevitable that leaders in the region will change, public opinion will shift and 
military capabilities will rise or decline, but the geography of the South China Sea 
dictates that it will always be a vital transit route and resource zone.
356
  China embracing 
a comprehensive multilateral settlement now will be able to shape an agreement that is 
advantageous to China while fostering cooperative regional relationships with other 
regional states.  
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 The alternative is continued confrontation with neighboring states, greater 
involvement by outside powers such as the United States in the dispute and further 
challenges before international tribunals, which will only serve to undermine China’s 
international stature.  The advisable course of action for China is to relinquish historic 
rights claims, reasonably settle disputes, enter into conformance with UNCLOS and have 
an opportunity to lead in writing the history of the Western Pacific for the 21
st
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